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A global house price bubble? 
Evaluation based on a new rent-price approach 
Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers 29/2006 
Katja Taipalus 




The dividend yield ratio in the stock markets is, to an extent, comparable to the 
rent-price ratio in the housing market. Taking advantage of this definitional 
similarity, one can then use the traditional unit root test for log dividend yield – in 
this case, the log rent-price ratio – to test for the existence of real estate bubbles. 
Such unit root tests are conducted for Finland, USA, UK, Spain and Germany, 
and the simple test results strongly suggest the existence of bubbles in nearly all 
of these countries. In addition to this, we develop a continuous and monthly rent-
price information-based method to track the periods when real estate prices 
diverge from their fundamental levels. This indicator seems to work quite well in 
most cases, indicating bubbles during periods which, according to the consensus 
literature, are seen as periods of sizable upward or downward shifts in house 
prices. 
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Kansainvälinen asuntomarkkinakupla – asuntojen 
vuokrien ja hintojen suhteeseen perustuva uusi 
lähestymistapa 
Suomen Pankin tutkimus 
Keskustelualoitteita 29/2006 
Katja Taipalus 




Osakemarkkinoilla käytössä olevaa osinkojen ja hintojen suhdelukua vastaavana 
voidaan asuntomarkkinoilla pitää vuokrien ja hintojen suhdelukua. Tämän vastaa-
vuuden vuoksi osinkojen ja hintojen suhdelukua hyödyntäviä analyysimenetelmiä 
voidaan käyttää myös asuntomarkkinoiden analysoinnissa. Tässä tutkimuksessa 
tarkastellaan rationaalisten kuplien olemassaoloa Suomen, Yhdysvaltojen, Ison-
Britannian, Espanjan ja Saksan asuntojen hinnoissa erilaisin yksikköjuuriperustei-
sin testein. Perusyksikköjuuritestien tulokset osoittavat että rationaalisia kuplia on 
esiintynyt lähes kaikkien testattujen maiden asuntomarkkinoilla. Edellisten testien 
lisäksi tutkimuksessa kehitetään ja sovelletaan uudenlaista lähestymistapaa, joka 
perustuu vuokrien ja hintojen tarkasteluun ns. rullaavien informaatioikkunoiden 
kautta. Tämän menetelmän etu aiempiin nähden on se, että sen avulla pystytään 
indikoimaan kuukausitasolla, ovatko markkina-arvostukset karkaamassa perustei-
den oikeuttamalta tasoltaan. Ensimmäisten tulosten valossa menetelmän tulokset 
vaikuttavat varsin mielenkiintoisilta. 
 
Avainsanat: asuntojen hinnat, kupla, yksikköjuuret 
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Recently many reports have expressed concern over rapid rises in house prices. 
Interestingly these concerns are not focused on one or even a couple of countries, 
but to on wide set of industrial countries. The same question concerning the 
sustainability of the present housing price level is being pondered in the US as 
well as in Europe. 
  The concern is justified as the behaviour of house prices influences through 
various channels in the economy. Concerning the regulators point, there are three 
core aspects, why regulators should be interested about the house price 
performance and price’s possible detachment from the fundamentally justified 
values, ie the formation of ‘house price bubbles’. Concerning monetary policy, an 
important link between asset prices and policy actions comes through inflation. 
Academic discussion on this field is focused around a couple of core questions. 
The first one relates to the asset prices ability to signal for future inflation growth 
and the second one relates to the overall measurement of inflation. For example 
Goodhart (1993) has recommended that central banks should replace the 
conventional inflation measures including prices of goods and services with 
broader measures that include housing and stock market prices.
1 This proposition 
has confronted also criticism (see Filardo (2000)
2). 
  Another point concerning the regulators view is the linkage between asset 
prices and their impact to overall stability of the financial system and to banking 
crises. An important channel in this respect is this liquidity-effect ie the collateral 
effect. There is a large literature related to the question concerning the financial 
stability aspect, but to mention few, we could name at least the following: Herrera 
and Perry (2003), Bean (2004), Mishkin and White (2003), Zhu (2005), Herring 
and Wachter (2003), von Goetz (2004), Davis and Zhu (2005) and FDIC (1997)). 
The linkage between house prices and banking crises seems to be largely 
dependent on the way how banks value the collateral and how collateral 
appreciation affects their balance-sheets. If their balance-sheets are marked-up, 
the results might be severe. Related to this practise there are large differences 
between countries. And when banks are shaking, especially in those cases when 
banks have a dominant role in the country’s financial system, the consequences 
for the whole economy could be severe. 
  Finally, the third reason why regulators need to pay attention to housing 
prices, is the reason related to the overall economic development, especially due 
                                 
1 Earlier Alchian and Klein (1973) recommended that asset prices should be included into the price 
indexes used to measure inflation. 
2 Concerning the housing prices, it is important to notice that according to Filardo’s results the 
housing price inflation does show some power in predicting future inflation, but stock market price 
inflation exhibits no power at all in predicting future consumer price inflation.  
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to the resource-allocating effects, wealth effects etc. Of course concerning the 
wealth effect, the strength of the effect is very much dependent on whether the 
house price gains are perceived to be permanent or temporary. Another important 
point is the liquidity of the housing financing system, while it affects how well the 
households can take advantage of the possible capital gains in house prices (Zhu, 
2005). Concerning the economic performance, Helbling and Terrones (2003) 
found in their research that house price busts are associated with output losses 
twice as large as equity bubbles and Zhu (2005) reported that increases in 
property prices were likely to have a positive impact on GDP in many of the 
countries included in his research, even though the magnitudes varied across 
sectors and countries. Detken and Smets (2004) analysed various macroeconomic 
variables in a pre-boom, boom and post-boom phases in the economy and came 
into the conclusion that not all booms lead to large output losses. They were able 
to separate some of the features that led into higher cost booms than the others. 
According to their results ‘The booms that were followed by a large recession, 
and in some cases financial instability, are typically longer, give rise to 
significantly greater real and monetary imbalances, and, in particular, are 
characterised by a big boom and bust in real estate markets’. In addition to this the 
high-cost booms are also characterised by a more positive inflation gap ie larger 
deviation from its trend.
3 
  Large crashes with far reaching effects in the real estate prices are more likely 
to happen when the prices have been severely mispriced, ie are in bubble. In this 
respect sound developments in the real estate markets would be crucial. In this 
research we take a closer look at the recent developments in housing markets in 
Europe as well as in the USA and provide a novel means to track out the 
fundamentally unjustified developments in the real estate markets. The novelty in 
the method developed in this paper relates to the usage of rent-price data, which 
has only in recent articles been applied to the real estate markets, even though the 
dividend-yields have been used already for a long time in the equity markets. The 
method is also novel in a sense that it utilizes the recent research results in the 
time-series analysis reported by Taylor (2005), Banerjee et al (1992) and applies 
their results to construct a rolling and frequently updating indicator of unit roots 
(ie indications of bubbles) in log rent-price ratios. The major advantage of the 
method is unarguably its ability to evaluate the developments with very short 
time-intervals instead of being tied to yearly or even longer periods, which 
previously have been the standard in the real estate related research. 
  The research proceeds as follows: In the section two we will describe the 
recent developments in housing markets, describe the reasons why the real estate 
                                 
3 For other sources, see for example Helbing (2005), Belsky and Prakken (2004), Benito and 
Wood (2005), Nothaft (2004), Benjamin, Chinloy and Jud (2003) and Goldman Sachs report from 
2003.  
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prices have risen so fast, evaluate if there are signs of bubbles in the real estate 
and housing prices and go through the price formation and the role of 
fundamentals in the real estate markets pricing. 
  In section 3 we introduce the basic dividend yield based approach measuring 
the unit roots in the data and how it could be used in the real estate context. In 
addition to this we will perform the first simple unit root tests to the country-data. 
In the end of the section we will present the novel price-rent based bubble 
indicator. In section 4 we will test the method’s indicating power by using the 
data from real estate markets of 5 countries as well as from the US in a regional 
level. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2  Recent developments in the housing markets 
House prices have risen strongly during the last eight years in most of the 
industrialised countries, although recently there have been some signs of cooling 
down in some countries, especially so in the UK. In the US the performance over 
the last 10 years has been amazing: according to the OFHEO (the Office of 
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight)-house price index the annual growth rate 
during these ten years has been 5.4% on average, being 68.9% over the whole 10 
years period (see for example Krainer and Wei, 2004). Since 1995 the increase 
have been roughly double the increase seen in the previous home price booms in 
the late 1970s and late 1980s as pointed out in McCarthy and Peach (2004) and 
from the fourth quarter of 2004 through the fourth quarter of 2005 the average US 
home prices increased by 12.95%. This despite of the fact that some of the recent 
indications have shown signs that a slowdown in the US housing markets might 
be forthcoming. Of course, there are very sharp regional differences in the house 
price developments within the US, while in some states (for example coastal 
areas) prices have risen much faster than for the whole nation. 
  Even though the rise in the US house prices has been very strong, the growth 
in the prices has been even stronger in Europe.
4 Price rises have been very strong 
in France, Spain, and Ireland as well as previously in the UK and in Netherlands, 
where the year 2001 witnessed one of the greatest increases in Europe. In 2004 
also Belgium, Italy, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Portugal saw price increases 
between 5–8%. But there are large differences between the developments in 
different countries in Europe. For example in Germany the housing-market 
                                 
4 As mentioned in the ECB (2003) report on structural factors in the EU housing markets, in most 
of the countries there can be spotted long cycles in the house prices around a moderate upward 
trend.  
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developments have been stagnant for years, but just recently it has shown some 
signs of picking up. 
 
 
2.1  Reasons for housing market pick-up 
As a main factor for the strong price rise in Europe can be seen the generally low 
interest rate level (both in real and in nominal terms), which in many European 
countries has induced the house prices to rise at a faster rate than either the overall 
economic growth or households’ disposable incomes as mentioned in the RICS 
report (RICS, 2004 and 2005). Due to the low interest rates people have been 
more eager to accept larger debts in order to buy a house of their own and this 
development have given support to the price rise. From the RICS statistics, it can 
actually be spotted that the prices have been rising especially strongly in those 
European countries, where the mortgage rates are based on short-term interest 
rates (Spain, UK and Ireland) and where the interest-rates of mortgages have 
therefore been rather low as the short-end of the yield curve has reacted strongly 
to the interest-rate level changes. In addition to the interest-rate developments, 
also the economic developments have seemed to be quite stabile until recently, 
and this on its behalf has helped to boost consumer confidence. 
  Similar reasons are on the background of the price growth in the US as well, 
where the main driver for the increased mortgage-demand has been the low 
interest-rate level. Indeed, prevailing interest rate-level does seem to have a 
dominant effect concerning the mortgage-demand: in the UK, where the long 
boom in the housing prices came into halt in the summer 2004, the reverse in the 
prices was mainly a result from series of interest rate rises by Bank of England. 
  Concerning the interest rates, it is worth making a difference between the 
nominal and real interest rates. During the last couple of years these two have 
been both very low. Most of the spending decisions are made based primarily on 
real interest rates, but the housing market seems to be significantly affected by the 
nominal interest rates.
5 Commonly the relationship between nominal interest rates 
and the amount of debt is held to be negative as higher nominal interest rates are 
seen to increase the debt service ratio and this on the other hand reduces the 
amount of debt individuals are willing to take. An increase in the real interest 
rates also reduces debt through two channels: higher real interest rate increases the 
price of the current consumption and higher interest rates increases also the debt 
servicing costs. More on the relationship between nominal interest rates and 
housing prices can be found among others from Arcelus and Meltzer (1973), 
                                 
5 See for example the remarks by governor Laurence H. Mayer on ‘affordable housing’ before the 
National Association of Affordable Housing Lenders’ 1997 Northeast Regional Conference in 
Boston on September the 4th 1997.  
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Muth (1986), Pozdena (1990) and Painter and Redfern (2002). Concerning 
housing demand and its relationship to real mortgage rates we could mention for 
example Titman 1982, Harris 1989 and Van Order and Dougherty 1991. 
 
 
2.2  Bubbles in the housing prices: the role of fundamentals 
Strongly rising real estate prices often lead to speculation and headlines, that there 
are bubbles developing to house prices. A core question then is, how can one say 
that the real estate prices are in bubble? This question is the same as asking, how 
can one say that prices are detached from their fundamentally justified level? 
Giving a proof for detachment of prices from the fundamentally justified level is 
not a simple job to do as there are no common agreements of the factors which 
actually establish the fundamental price in the real estate markets. The pricing 
process in the real estate markets is regarded as a relatively complex process 
where expectations as well as real economic variables together form the final 
market price. Among the core variables, which are seen to affect the pricing of the 
real estates are the following: household incomes, interest rates, supply (especially 
so in the short-run), financial market institutions, demographic variables, 
availability of credit, taxes, public policies directed to housing etc. (see for 
example ECB 2003, Lamont and Stein 1999, Tsatsaronis and Zhu 2004 and IMF’s 
WEO 2004). 
  It is true that the housing markets are very vulnerable concerning possible 
mispricing. As Krainer and Wei (2004) mention: ‘Most market participants have 
little experience, making transactions only infrequently. Asymmetric or 
incomplete information between buyers and sellers about demand and prices is 
acute … matching of buyers with sellers is cumbersome and slow. And unlike 
other markets, there are no good ways to ‘short’ the housing markets if prices get 
too high’. It is thought that especially the inexperience and infrequency of part of 
the market operators could increase the risk of housing markets mispricing. 
  One way to approach the fundamental value in the real estate markets would 
be to examine the rent-price ratios in the markets. As known, in a sense rent-price 
ratios can be seen to correspond the dividend-yields in the stock markets as 
dividends and rents both represent the underlying capital component ie uncertain 
future capital flows associated to the asset. In the financial literature the asset’s 
fundamental value always equals the sum of its future payoffs, each being 
discounted back to its present value by investors using rates that reflect their 
preferences (see for example Krainer and Wei, 2004). In the stock markets this 
relationship is between discounted dividends and stock prices, but in the housing 
market this relationship could be thought to exist between rents and house prices, 
the reasoning being following as described in Krainer’s and Wei’s (2004) article  
12 
‘The fundamental value of a house is the present value of the future housing 
service flows that it provides to the marginal buyer.
6 In a well-functioning market, 
the value of the housing service flow should be approximated by the rental value 
of the house.’ This meaning that the price of the house should be approximately 
the discounted future flow of rents that it would give, if it would be rented. Earlier 
for example Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai (2005) as well as McCarthy and Peach 
(2004) have operated with the rent-to-price (price-to-rent) ratios. 
  When using the rent-price ratios, also the bubble-concept would become 
easier to define: the developments in the house prices or rents should not differ 
too much from each other, while otherwise this would mean that bubble would 
appear in the housing markets. 
  It sounds temptating and easy, but it must be noticed, that there are some 
important differences between rents and dividends, which actually can severely 
affect the way how well they truly compare with each other. The first difference 
comes through the way the dividends and rents are dependent on underlying price-
developments. In the stock markets, arise in the stock’s price level signalises of 
expected higher earnings and therefore higher dividends. In the housing markets 
the chain of events goes a bit differently: the price rises in the markets actually 
advance the rent arises which then happen with a lag compared to the price 
developments. Another important difference is the way how the decisions on 
dividends and rents are made: dividends are decided by the board of a firm 
(possibly according to varying motivators) while the rents realising in the markets 
are an outcome of a negotiation process. 
  In the section 3 we will present the fundamental model constructing the 
bubble-test for the rational bubbles in the housing markets. Originally this 
approach has been developed to stock markets, but if we assume that we can 
handle dividends and rents similarly ie both representing the uncertain future cash 
flows associated to an asset, we can apply the same test of unit-roots also to the 
housing markets. But as pointed out in various articles, this might approve 
problematic mainly for two reasons: in the unit-root testing method the rents are 
supposed to move freely without any restrictions. This is not completely true in 
reality as there are rent-controls in many of the countries where we have data 
from. In most of the countries rents have been less restricted only since the mid 
1990s, meaning that before this the rent-level has been too sticky compared to the 
changes in the price-level. In many countries also the social sector in rental 
markets might be rather large, affecting therefore also to the average rental-levels 
appearing in data. This could lead to very susceptible indications of bubbles, 
while the relationship between the rents and prices would break down quite easily 
leading then to the indication of a bubble in our method. Due to its importance, 
the rent-control is more thoroughly handled in the Appendix 1. In this appendix 
                                 
6 It must be noticed that this argument ignores the potential effects of taxation.  
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we will also present the list of major regulatory changes concerning the rents in 
Europe, as they do affect the way the country-level indications should be 
interpreted. The second reason is that when we are operating with the raw-data, it 
is not possible to take into account the impact of taxes or interest-rates in the rent-




2.3  Are there signals of bubbles in the real estate markets? 
Related to the current market situation in the housing-markets, are there then 
some worrying features present? We have noticed in several countries a strong 
price-upheaval, but this might be partly explained through low interest rates and 
therefore increased attraction towards ownership, at least in the short-run. 
  Concerning the bubbling features, we do have some interesting information 
for example from the US. One of these features has been the enormously 
increased faith to continuously rising prices. As history has shown, the basic 
reason for the bubbles has always been the speculation and related to it the 
growing overconfidence among the market players: people have become too 
confident that this ‘sure thing’ will always make them money. This feature has 
been documented lately in the housing markets, for example by Case and Shiller 
(2003). Case and Shiller did a survey for 2000 households who bought homes in 
May 1988 as well as to comparable group who bought home between March and 
August 2002. The results from the 1988 survey provided strong evidence, that 
there existed a bubble in the 1988: ‘buyers were influenced by an investment 
motive, that they had strong expectations about future price changes in the 
housing markets, and that they perceived little risk … emotion and casual word of 
mouth played a significant role in home purchase decision. In addition, there was 
no agreement among buyers about the causes of recent home price movements 
and no cogent analysis of the fundamentals.’ 
  Compared to this the situation in the US in 2003 looked quite similar in few 
respects: once again housing was seen as an investment, even though less so in 
2003 than in 1988. Concerning the riskiness, only small amount of buyers thought 
that housing markets involved a great deal of risk (though there appeared some 
regional differences) and the absolute majority of the answerers did see some or 
little/no risk. The expectations of the future price performance were high in 1988 
as well as in the 2003 survey: approximately 90% of the respondents expected the 
prices to increase during the next several years. 
  As a bit alarming we could also held the expectations concerning the long-run 
price changes: the aggregate response of yearly price change was over 12% in 
                                 
7 In the future work we are taking into account the impact of taxes and interest rates and exploring 
their effects to the results.  
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2003, compared to clearly minor percentages in 1988. Based on these results Case 
and Shiller (2003) concluded that ‘these general indicators of the defining 
characteristics of bubbles were fairly strong in 2003’.
8 Besides Case and Shiller 
(2003) also Zhou and Sornette (2005) have analyzed the quarterly average sales 
prices of new houses sold in the US in order to determine whether the prices have 
grown faster-than-exponential, which they take as the diagnostic of a bubble. 
Their conclusion is that the 22 states (mostly Northeast and West) exhibit clear-
cut signals of fast growing bubble. 
  These developments in the US seem to have continued until recently. In 
March 2005 the New York Times reported
9 that according to the National 
Association of Realtors ‘nearly one-quarter of home purchases last year were 
made by people who thought of the house as an investment rather than a place to 
live’
10 and according to the government reports the sales of new homes jumped 
sharply in February, being the largest monthly increase in four years. Furthermore 
according to the recent report by the Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard 
University (2005), between 1998 and 2003 the share of home purchase loans 
made to other than owner-occupants climbed from 7 to 11 per cent.
11 This can 
partly be held as a signal of speculation in the housing markets. In the spring 2005 
also ABN AMRO reported in their overnight report on April 20th,
12 where they 
quoted an article originally published in the LA Times article, that ‘buy now, pay 
later’ – mentality prevails amongst mortgage borrowers who are taking interest-
only loans. According to the report these loans accounted already one-third of the 
new mortgages nationally last year, making it possible for more marginal 
homebuyers to become a house owners. 
  The possible problem seems to be, that expectations of the continuing price 
upheaval could give some indications of possible bubbling pressures. The core 
question is that if expectations will break down, will this result in problems? One 
possible source of problems could be the risen ratio of total household liabilities 
to income (at the moment the ratios of house prices to median household incomes 
are at their 25-year high in more than half of the evaluated metro areas in the 
USAs mentioned in the JCHS report). Even though this ratio has risen strongly 
since the end of 1990s, sofar it has not led to increases in financial stress. In the 
                                 
8 But there were regional differences: ‘they were generally less strong than in 1988 in the glamour 
cities and stronger than in 1988 in Milwaukee’. 
9 The New York Times, March 25th 2005: ‘Trading Places: Real Estate Instead of Dot-Coms’. 
10 The National association of Realtors conducted the first survey of second-home owners profiles 
in 2002 through a joint e-mail and mail survey. Concerning the motivations of owning the second 
homes, nearly 78 per cent were reported to be vacation homes as opposed to investment homes or 
land in 2002. 
11 Investors operated actively also in the new homes market as they bought 4% of new single-
family houses and 13% of condos, as can be seen from the JCHS report. 
12 ABN Amro ‘If you can fog a mirror, you can get a home loan…’, an overnight report, April 
20th, 2005.  
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ABN Amro’s report this is argued to be due to the fact that the ratio arises has 
been offset by the overall strength in the economy. Core question in this sense 
will be the future interest-rate developments and thereby also developments in the 
inflation. 
 




Source: ABN Amro’s overnight report 20th April 2005. 
 
 
3  Unit-root based approach 
In this section we will prsent the fundamental model constructing the bubble-test 
for the rational bubbles in the housing markets. The method in this section relies 
heavily on four sources: to Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997), Campbell and 
Shiller (1988a and b) as well as to Koustas and Serletis (2005). Concerning the 
housing market it is probably true that the prices are driven out of their 
equilibrium values due to the increases in demand, but the underlying motive of 
the increased demand might not be a speculative one, but might come through few 
factors: loose financing (meaning easy access to credit), low nominal interest 
rates, good outlook in personal finances and through a scare that the prices 
continue to arise further (even if prices would seem high → if don’t buy now, 
won’t be able to afford it later). 
  Concerning the testing-method, let us begin by defining the net simple return 
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where Rt+1 denotes the return on the asset held from time t to t+1, P the price of 
the asset and D the dividend ie rent in the housing markets. The return is not 
known until period t+1. Taking the expectation of identity (3.1), which is based on 
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The last term in the equation (3.3) is the expected discounted value of the asset 
price k periods ahead. As the horizon lengthens, this term is assumed to converge 
to zero. This assumption is satisfied unless the asset price is expected to grow 
forever at rate Rt+k or faster. Under the convergence assumption, equation (3.3) 
can be solved forward by expressing the fundamental value of the asset, Ft, as the 
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Abandoning the convergence assumption leads to an infinite number of solutions, 
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ie the price comprises the fundamental value plus the component Bt, which 
denotes a rational bubble. 
  So far expected asset returns were assumed to be constant. Though this 
assumption is convenient, it contradicts with the reality as the expected returns to 
an asset are time-varying, making the relationship between prices and returns 
nonlinear. To overcome the problems due to nonlinearity, Campbell and Shiller 
(1988a) suggest a loglinear approximation.  
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  The loglinear approximation is given by 
 
t 1 t 1 t 1 t p d ) 1 ( p k r − ρ − + ρ + ≈ + + +
13 (3.6) 
 
Approximation (3.6) holds exactly when the log rent-price ratio is constant as then 
dt+1 and pt+1 move together one-to-one. Equation (3.6) is a linear difference 
equation for the log asset price and it is analogous to the linear difference equation 
for the level of the asset price with returns expected constant. In similar way as 
before, we can impose the no-rational-bubble terminal condition. Solving forward 
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Equation (3.7) shows that if the asset price is currently at a high level, then there 
must be some combination of high rents and low asset returns in the future. This 
holds ex post, but also ex ante. For the ex ante version, we can take expectations 
of (3.7) and take into account that Et[pt] = pt, to get 
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Equation (3.8) is a dynamic generalisation of the Gordon formula.
14 The main 
difference is that in the dynamic formula the effect on the asset price depends on 
how long the rent growth rate is expected to be high or the discount rate low. 
Finally we can rewrite equation (3.8). Instead of using the log asset price, we use 
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We focus now on equation (3.9). Recalling that Craine (1993) pointed out that if 
Δdt and rt are stationary stochastic processes, then the log rent-price ratio, dt–pt, is 
a stationary stochastic process under the no-rational-bubble restriction. Therefore, 
if we can find a unit root in the log rent-price ratio, this is consistent with the 
existence of rational bubbles in asset prices in the case when Δdt and rt are 
stationary and stochastic processes. 
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≡ ρ . 
14 With the expectation of constant required returns and constant dividend growth.  
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  Results of the simple unit root tests to the log rent-price series can be seen 
from table 2. According to these tests we can not reject the unit root hypothesis in 
any of these cases (except for the UK in case when trend is included), meaning 
that there has been a bubble or bubbles in the real estate prices in these countries 
during the periods in focus. It must be noticed, that in Germany the rejection in 
the augmented Dickey-Fuller is quite close though as the t-value is quite close to 
the critical value. 
 
 
3.1 Rolling  augmented  Dickey-Fuller test as an indicator 
A drawback in the previous test procedure is that the simple unit root test answers 
only the question whether there is a bubble or possibly bubbles in the asset price 
data during the whole period which the tested data covers. It is not capable to 
separate when bubbles exactly take place. This is why our next focus will be to try 
to localize the possible existence of bubbles more exactly from the ‘dividend 
yield’ time series data. In order to do this we will develop a completely new 
method based on an indicator constructed by using the ordinary augmented 
Dickey-Fuller method. In order to get frequently updating indicator, we will 
estimate the ADF by using a rolling window of 12 data observations. 
  In order to test for the existence of unit-roots in the log rent-price ratios with 
the augmented Dickey-Fuller in equation (3.9), we should first choose the 
appropriate lag-structure for the augmented Dickey-Fuller regression. With the 
ADF we are able to control for higher order correlation. After diagnostic analysis 
the augmented Dickey-Fuller regression to be used in testing for the non-
stationarity of the log rent-price ratios would be (3.10).
15 This regression is used 
in rolling sub-samples. 
 
1 t 1 1 t t ) p d ( ) p d ( ) p d ( − − − Δ δ + − γ + μ = − Δ  (3.10) 
 
                                 
15 A bit problematic is that the rolling method treats all periods alike and cannot separate between 
possible regime shifts. On the other hand, if the regime shift affects other factors than 
fundamentals and causes a strong price reaction in the real estate market, shouldn’t this be treated 
as any other pressure towards pricing? Therefore it would be justified to measure the building 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Our primary interest in the regression is the value of the coefficient γ, as it can be 
interpreted as signalling non-stationarities in the log rent-prices. As known, the 
augmented specification is generally used to test whether H0:γ = 0  holds  (H0 
accepted) against the alternative hypothesis H1:γ < 0,  γ ≥  0, thus, being an 
indication of explosive ie non-stationary process, when the residuals are normally 
distributed. This leads to a very simple interpretation: a value of coefficient γ 
greater than zero would indicate periods where dividend flows do not match the 
asset price level. In another words, such values would indicate the presence of 
bubbles in asset prices.
16 
  Of course, we could have operated with critical t-values instead of using only 
0-level, as is usually done with the augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. Problem is, 
that in that case we should have taken into account the small sample-sizes in 
choosing the critical t-values and those critical t-values should have been 
simulated. More information about the chosen method with 0 as the critical level, 
method’s statistical reliability and statistical characteristics can be found from 
Taipalus (2006), where we gore more thoroughly through the method in the stock 
market context and perform simulations in order to test out the method’s 




The data used in this research includes price indices as well as rent indices from 
each of the countries in focus. As mentioned in many references, for instance in 
McCarthy’s and Peach’s (2004) article, in ECB’s (2003) article as well as in 
RICS’s European housing review (2004), there are many weaknesses related to 
the usage and construction of these indices. Solely related to the price-indices we 
could list the following weaknesses: the underlying data comes from various 
sources and the statistics are compiled in various ways, the houses are 
heterogeneous assets and their qualities vary and in addition there are short-term 
fluctuations (seasonality etc.) that are not necessarily reflecting any long-term 
changes in house price trends and the differences in statistics between countries 
are large (non-harmonized national data, differences in coverage). Indeed, 
comparison between different countries is very difficult. Same problems relate to 
rent-statistics. 
  As we are using this data to measure when there are bubbling pressures in the 
real estate markets, these weaknesses have an affect on those evaluations as well. 
                                 
16 One drawback is that the distribution of residuals from the regression in our data is not precisely 
normally distributed. The residual distributions did show significant kurtosis compared to the 
normal distribution, more about the distributions by country-level can be seen from Appendix 2.  
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Therefore the results should be interpreted with certain caution due to these basic 
flaws in the data. 
  Table 3 describes our data in more detail. Most of the rent-information was 
taken from the OECD-database in order to reach some commensurability. 
 
Table 3.   Basic data used to calculate the D/Y 
      (= rent index/price index) 
 
Country Price-index  Rent-index 
USA  Office of Federal Housing 
Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) 
House Price Index (HPI) for 
period 1983Q1–2004Q4. 
 
‘the HPI is a broad measure of the 
movement of single-family house 
prices’. For more: 
www.ofheo.gov 
a) OECD main economic indicators, 
the housing-component from CPI. It 
must be noticed that OECD’s data is 
not the pure rent-data. 
 
b) BLS’s (Bureau of Labour Statistics) 
owner’s equivalent rent of primary 
residence-component from CPI. 
Aggregated to quarter level by Bank 
of Finland’s statistical program and 
indexed as 1983Q1=100. for more: 
www.bls.gov 
Finland  House Price Index from Statistics 
Finland, period 1981Q1–2004Q4. 
Rent-information: CPI’s rent 
component. This information includes 
also water, heat etc. Information from 
Statistics Finland. 
Spain  House Price Index -information 
was originally in form euro/sq. 
meter. Information is from the 
web-pages of Ministerio de la 
Vivienda www.mviv.es. Period: 
1987Q1–2004Q4. 
OECD’s Housing component from the 
CPI. 
Germany  (Single family) House Price Index 
from Statistics Germany. 
Aggregated to the quartal-level by 
the statistical program of Bank of 
Finland. Period: 1968Q1–
2004Q4. 
OECD’s Housing component from the 
CPI. 
Buba publishes pure rent-series, but 
this information is relatively short. 
When compared, the OECD’s and the 
Buba’s rent series did not differ very 
much. 
UK  House Price Index from Office of 
Deputy Prime Minister. Period: 
1968Q2–2004Q4. 
OECD’s Housing component from the 
CPI. Pure rent-series is available, but 




4  Results from the rolling sub-sample ADF-
indicator 
In order to have a quarterly updating value of the indicator, ie the coefficient γ in 
the ADF-regression, we should have a rolling window of data observations that 
are used for the estimation of the regression (3.10). By a ‘window’ it is meant the 
length of the sample of the log rent-price ratio data that will be included in the 
estimation of the ADF-regression at a time. The data where we base our 
estimations on is the data of price-rent ratios, which was already introduced in the 
section 3.2. 
  Concerning the length of the window ie the sub-sample, we tried out several 
possibilities. After statistical deduction it seemed that the 12 quartals (3 years) 
rolling window (meaning that the regression (3.10) is always estimated by using 
last 12 quartals dividend yield data) gave us useful indications in the sense that the 
indications from the shorter window-periods focused around and on the 
indications given by the 12 quartals rolling period. Concerning the time series 
properties it must be taken into account that in order to have robust results the 
period chosen to be included into the regression estimation window should be as 
long as possible.
17 This is a serious scarcity concerning our method where we 
estimate a regression using only 12 observations.
18 
 Regarding  the  bubble-indications, given by the coefficient γ, it is important to 
notice that bubble-indications don’t realise only when prices are rising at higher 
pace than could be justified according to the rent flow (as was the case in positive 
rational bubbles), but also when prices are descending faster that could be 
justified according to the rent flow. This is due to the fact that the underlying 
model behind this theory is the present-value pricing formula, according to which 
the prices and dividends (here rents) should be cointegrated. This does not happen 
when the relationship is explosive ie when the γ > 0. In this sense this indicator 
should be able to react to either large over- or undervaluations in the market prices 
compared to their fundamentals. 
  Next we can take a closer look at the bubble-indications given by the ADF-
based indicator. As we remember, any time when γ  >  0 in case of a normal 
distribution, we held this as an indication of a bubble in the markets, while 
according to the present value model, in these cases the level of the rent flow does 
not correspond the price level prevalent in the markets. 
 
                                 
17 Using this method, the parameter γ-values are always tied to the last month included to the data 
window. 
18 Window lengths and results sensitiveness to these choices is more thoroughly gone through in 
Taipalus (2006).  
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4.1 Country-level  evidence 
The periods identified as bubbles by the 12 quartals rolling window indicator for 
the Finnish, German, Spanish, UK and US real estate markets are presented in 
figures 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 7 (we modified the quartal data into a monthly data 
through a statistical program and counted the indications for rolling 36 months 
data, these results are presented as figures A2.1-A2.5 in Appendix 3). 
  Indicator-graphs, figures 3–8, show the bubble-indications together with 
price-index information. The added price-index information is the cumulative %  
-changes in the price indices over the 12 quartals period. 
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Looking at the figure 3, we can spot four periods signalized as bubbles in the 
Finnish real estate markets. These periods are the following: from late 1983 until 
the early 1984, from autumn 1987 until early 1989, from spring 1992 until early 
1993 and finally a period that starts somewhere round autumn 2003 (gets very 
close to 0) and lasts until summer 2004. All of these periods are related to strong 
arise in the price index, except for the one in the beginning of the 1990s, which  
24 
could be held as an indication of a negative bubble ie signal that the prices of the 
properties have corrected too strongly downwards compared to the rent-level.
19 
  According to Laakso (2000) the housing markets at national and regional 
levels experienced dramatic changes during 1980s and 1990s in Finland. 
Especially housing prices and housing construction experienced a boom in the 
second half of 1980s and a collapse in the beginning of 1990s. It is worth noticing 
that according to Laakso, there is no evidence on a major price bubble, but the 
boom and the collapse of prices could mainly be explained through the 
developments of income, employment, interest rates and vacancy rates. According 
to him also the liberalisation of financial markets and the accumulation in credit 
had a significant effect on housing price boom. 
  Concerning the bubble-indications, the first period (from late 1983 until the 
early 1984) is rather hard to link to any economic booms. On the other hand a lot 
easier is to link the next indication from autumn 1987 until early 1989 to the 
overall economic development. The growth in the real estate prices during this 
period was exponential: the real prices rose 60% from the second quartal of 1987 
until the first quartal of 1989. This period matches well to the bubble-indication 
given by the ADF-coefficient. The given indications appear not so surprising if 
we take a look at the rent-markets at the time. The rents did not rise as strongly 
during the last years of 1980s as did the prices due to the rent-control,
20 the only 
exception was that the decrease in the rents stopped during the real estate price 
boom. Rent-control clearly affects the functioning of the indicator, while strong 
rises in the price-level and sticky rents lead quickly to break in the cointegrating 
relationship between these two variables. 
  Concerning the Finnish data, only the rents from the early 1990s onwards 
reflects the true pressures in the rent-markets. In this respect it is interesting to 
notice the negative bubble that the indicator signals for the period starting from 
spring 1992 and lasting until early 1993. This period is related to the economic 
crises that Finland confronted in the early 1990s, which was the most severe since 
the 1930s: The real GDP decreased by 11% during the three years (1991–1993) 
and the unemployment rate rose from 3% in 1990 to 16% in 1993. The real estate 
prices reacted by sinking strongly: the crash begun in the autumn 1989 and 
continued non-stop for four years, reaching bottom in the first quartal of 1993. 
Once again this period matches well the bubble-indications given by our indicator. 
  The last period indicated as a bubble by the ADF-based indicator relates to the 
present phase of strongly rising property prices. According to the indications the 
bubble has developed to Finnish real estate prices. The bubble-indications were 
                                 
19 The early 1990’s is a very exceptional period in Finland, it might even represent a regime-shift 
in a sence. 
20 As Laakso mentions, the amount of rentables decreased strongly during the period when the 
rent-control was in force in Finland. This was changed in the early 1990s (relaxation of the rent-
control, changes in the taxation etc.).  
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close already in the beginning of 2003, but the zero level was finally breached in 
the beginning of 2004. 
  Besides the Finnish data, we could also take a look to the real estate D/Y’s in 
some other countries and examine how well does the ADF-indicator work with 
their data. A good reference in this respect is Germany, as the developments in the 
real estate markets in Germany are commonly held as very stable during the last 
decades and therefore no bubbles should be signalized. 
  When looking at the bubble indications in the figure 5 we can see that the 
indicator indicates three periods as bubbles regardless the fact that according to 
the general acceptance there shouldn’t be any. The periods indicated as bubbles 
according to the adf-coefficient are the periods starting from summer 1978 until 
the end of 1978, early 1997 as well as the period starting from summer 2003 and 
lasting until the end of 2003. Other noteworthy features of the indicator are its 
large volatility and its upward trend. 
  Concerning the housing policies, 1950s and 1960s favoured rental building in 
Germany and the renovation programmes since 1970s continued that bias (see for 
example RICS, 2004). Due to this fact, according to RICS (2004) only 41% of the 
housing stock is owner occupied and private rental housing constitutes 48% of the 
housing stock in the West. 
  Rents in Germany are regulated in several different levels: there are broad 
federal rules, regional Länder policies and municipalities with their own specific 
rules. Rents are usually negotiated freely at the point when households rent the 
dwellings, but after this contract the rent-controls apply.
21 Strict are also the rules 
governing the increases that can be placed on rents, meaning that the overall rent 
levels may lag far behind the current ‘true’ market rents. This is something that 
could partly explain why even relatively small price changes could break up the 
relationship between the rents and prices and signals of bubbles would be reached. 
At least it could explain some of the observed volatility. Looking at the house 
price changes in Germany during the period 1975–2004, we could actually spot 
two periods featured with quicker growth (neither being too dramatic). The first 
period was experienced during 1978–1981 and the second from 1989-until the end 
of 1992. The first of these periods matches quite well the period of the bubble-
indication, but the second-one is in this sense a bit problematic. 
  The strong price rise in the late 1980s and early 1990s is related to the 
substantial increase in housing demand in Germany, while the immigration from 
east led to sharp rise in the demand of housing in western Germany.
22 This 
pressure also had an effect to rents: previous peak in rents had been experienced 
in 1983, but by 1987 the year-on-year increase in rents had reached its lowest 
                                 
21 Therefore instead of using information on all rents, we should focus on newly agreed 
agreements, as only these reflect the prevalent market pressures. 
22 Notice: the German unification.  
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level during the eighties at 1.6%. By 1993 this level had risen to 6%, to similar 
levels, which had last been seen in the early seventies. At this time and due to the 
strong price-rise, the government ‘saw fit to foster the construction of new 
housing by means of a whole series of promotional measures’, as mentioned in 
Deutche Bundesbank’s monthly report in January 2002. Maybe this led to the 
partly excess supply in the German housing markets, which has led the house 
prices to sunk below their long-run equilibrium level as reported for example by 
PwC.
23 This could have led to sluggish development in the housing markets 
during the few last years: as reported in the Economist article
24 on April the 20th, 
the German house prices (the Economist’s house price index) moved downwards 
in 2003 by 1.7% and in 2004 by 1.3% compared to the previous year’s values. 
Perhaps then the final indications of bubbles in the figure 4 could be held as 
signals of too much downward correction in prices
25 and therefore as signals of 
negative bubbles. 
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23 PriceWaterhouseCoopers: European Economic Outlook, June, 2001. 
24 The Economist: Will the Walls Come Falling Down?, 20th of April 2005. 
25 One point in this respect is the quality of the available price information, while it was altered by 
our own atatistical program to quartal lelvel.  
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Besides Germany we had the required data for the construction of the indicator 
available for example from Spain. Since 1976 the average Spanish house prices 
have risen sixteen-fold in nominal terms and they have doubled in real terms as 
mentioned by Pages and Maza (2003). 
  Concerning the developments during the last decade, three rather different 
periods could after all be separated from the Spanish data. First a period from 
1987 to 1991, when the real estate prices experienced an expansionary phase, 
secondly a period from 1992 until 1997 which was a period with flat growth and 
finally a period from 1998 to the present day which once again was featured with 
strong expansionary growth (for example Pages and Maze, 2003). In Spain the 
year 2003 was the time of the strongest price increases in whole Europe. In the 
national level prices rose as much as 16% during the second quarter of 2003. 
  Examining the Spanish rental markets, it can be noticed that most of it is in 
private hands and only a small amount can be classified as social. Overall the 
amount of the rentable dwellings is the smallest in the whole Europe: According 
to RICS (2004) only 15% of housing is rented. The rental markets have been 
under rent-control, pro-ownership subsidies as well as tax-reliefs, meaning that 
the true rent increases have been limited to years after mid 1990s, as mentioned 
also in the RICS’s (2004) review. Concerning these developments in rents, it 
should be pointed out that the indicator-values in our bubble-testing procedure are 
therefore more reliable only during the last few years. 
  As was mentioned, two booms can be identified from the Spanish real estate 
markets during the last decade or so: the first lasted from 1987 until 1991, during 
which the real house prices rose by over 80% (RICS, 2004). This increase was 
followed by an economic slowdown during which the house prices fell by 17%. A 
new economic recovery started in 1998 and together with falling interest rates 
fuelled a new price rise in the housing markets that even steepened since 1999. 
Even clearer this steep rise seen in prices has been in Madrid. Concerning the 
overall developments in the mortgage markets, it is worthwhile to take into 
account that traditionally mortgages played relatively small role in the Spanish 
housing market, but during recent years their role have strengthened: since 1990 
the outstanding mortgage debt as a percentage of GDP has doubled, being 32% in 
2001 (for more, see RICS European household review 2004). 
  Based on this information, we can reflect the bubble-indications received 
from the ADF-coefficient in Spain. Indeed, there are two periods signalised as 
bubbles in the Spanish real estate data as seen in the figure 5: the first period starts 
around the beginning of the 1997 and lasts until autumn 1997 and the second 
period starts in the beginning of 2000 and lasts all the way until today. 
Concerning the indications, especially the last one is easy to explain with the 
strong price upheaval in the real asset prices in Spain. Also Pages and Maze 
(2003) conclude their article with notice that there are some evidence of 
overvaluation during the last few years in the real estate markets. They wrote: ‘the  
28 
evidence presented points to a current overvaluation of house prices which would, 
nonetheless, be compatible with trends in the explanatory variables and with 
dynamic historical pattern of response of prices to those trends.’ Their conclusion 
is that some correction in prices might be expected in the future. 
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A bit longer data we had available from the UK. The most recent national boom in 
the house prices was experienced in the UK starting from 1997. Measured 
annually the house price inflation peaked at 2002, Q3 at 26%. Concerning the 
earlier booms and busts in the house prices, there can be identified a boom in the 
1988–1989, slightly smaller boom/bust in late 1970s/early 1980s and one in the 
early years of 1970s. Interestingly all of these periods have more or less been 
identified as bubbles by the adf-coefficient, while it gives the precise indications 
for the following periods (figure 6): From 1972Q1–1973Q4, 1981Q4–1982Q2, 
1987Q1–1988Q4, 1999Q2–1999Q3 and 2002Q2–2003Q1. 
  Behind the recent price-upheaval one can see several fundamental reasons: 
during the recent years the economy has been in a strong position. Growth has 
been over its long-time potential, while unemployment and inflation have stayed 
low (RICS, 2004). Private consumption has been strong and the amount of 
mortgage borrowing has boomed. Mortgage markets have been booming due to 
the low nominal interest rates: indeed, the year 2003 made a new record in the  
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levels of borrowing. RICS (2004) reports that ‘by the autumn of 2003 house price 
to loan and mortgage income to income ratios for both first-time buyers and 
moving existing owners were higher than they had been at the peak of the last 
boom in 1989’. Therefore some researchers have suspected that there could lay a 
risk that the heavily indebted consumers might under certain circumstances create 
a negative demand shock to the economy. This remains to be seen. 
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Finally we could take a look at the US housing-markets. In the US earlier larger 
house price booms were experienced in the late 1970s and late 1980s. The latest 
boom has been going on since 1995. When looking at the year-over-year 
percentage changes in the home prices during these three booming periods, the 
first period resulted approximately 13% real appreciation, the second one a 17% 
real appreciation and the last one approximately a 36% real appreciation (for 
example McCarthy-Peach, 2004). 
  While the US experiences were more thoroughly handled in the section 1.4 
and will be handled in section 4, we could take a look to the periods identified as 
bubbles by the ADF-indicator and find out whether they match the booming 
periods specified above. The difference between the figures comes through the 
underlying data: In the first one we have used rent-information from BLS and in 
the second one we are using the OECD’s CPI component information.  
30 
  The periods which are identified as being bubbles are much the same in both 
of these figures: the first period starts at the end of 1986 and lasts until the autumn 
1987, the second period is in the beginning of the year 1995 and the third period 
starts in the autumn 1998 lasting until the end of 2001 and reappearing again in 
the autumn 2003, just to continue all the way until present. It seems that compared 
to the market developments the timing of bubble-signals matches well the periods 
when there has been a strong arise in the house prices (see figures 7 and 8). 
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Figure 8.  Real estate bubble-indications, 

































































1985q1 1990q1 1995q1 2000q1 2005q1




4.2 Regional  developments  in the US housing markets 
Instead of using only country-level data it seemed worthwhile to examine this 
method more thoroughly with regional data, while with regional data it could 
easily be tested if the method would be able to separate between region-specific 
developments. 
  Good regional data for this purpose was quite hard to find. The longest data 
was found from the US. The geographical areas in the US were chosen so that 
they would represent different parts of the country: a bit problematic was that 
there were no such series available which would leave all metropoles outside. 
This could have helped in testing the ADF-methodology, while we could have 
used truly rural area rent and price-series as a reference (with an expectation that 
there are no bubbles in the rural areas). 
  First we should try out the basic unit root tests. In several recent pieces of 
literature the panel-based unit root tests have been emphasized to have a higher 
power than unit root tests based on individual series.
26 Due to this we first 
                                 
26 Concerning the panel unit root tests, see for example Breitung (2000); Im, Pesaran and Shin 
(2003); Hadri (2000); Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) etc.  
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performed pooled unit root tests to the local-level US data consisting of the 
following 6 areas: Los Angeles (incl. Riverside and Orange County), San 
Francisco (incl. Oakland and San Jose), New York (incl. New Jersey-Long 
Island), Boston (incl. Brocton and Nashua), Cleveland-Akron as well as Chicago 
(incl. Gary and Kenosha). As remembered from the section 3, the existence of unit 
root in the log dividend yield was held to be consistent with rational bubbles in 
asset prices. 
  The area level data was collected from two sources: The rent data at area level 
was gathered from BLS at quartal frequency
27 and the price-data was collected 
from OFHEO’s database.
28 We confronted some troubles with the price-data, 
since the areas did not correspond directly to those reported by BLS. Problem was 
solved through using the metropolitan statistical area grouping: we combined the 
area price information, weighting it with the amount of inhabitants and combining 
the weighted price-information into larger groups in order to get the areas to 
correspond to those reported by BLS. 
  The results of the pooled unit root tests are reported in the following table 
(table 4). The data covers period from 1984Q1 until 2005Q1. There are 6 cross-
sections and the total amount of observations is 474. We performed the tests with 
varying assumptions concerning the regressors: first we did the tests without 
regressors as well as with individual intercepts and finally combined the 
individual intercepts with individual trends. As seen from results, the choice 
between these produces large differences in results. When looking at the graphs of 
the log dividend yields, the best option would be to include the individual 
intercepts into the tests. As a lag selection method we have used either Schwarz 
information criteria or the Akaike information criteria and Newey-West using 
Bartlett kernel for the bandwidth selection. 
 
                                 
27 www.bls.gov. The rent-information is part of the CPI-data series and can be downloaded from 
the web-pages. 
28 www.ofheo.gov.  
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Table 4.   Pooled unit root tests for the regional US data 
 
Unit root test  Method  Statistic  Prob.  Result 
Exogen.  Common unit root:      
variables:  Levin, Lin & Chu  -4.755  0.000  Rejection of unit root 
None  Breitung  1.310  0.904  No rejection, common unit 
root process 
 Hadri
a –  –  – 
        
Lags: SIC,  Individual unit root:     
0 to 3  Augmented Dickey-Fuller  36.831  0.000  Rejection of unit root 
  Phillips-Perron  58.163  0.000  Rejection of unit root 
  Im, Pesaran & Shin  –  –  – 
        
Exogen.  Common unit root:      
variables: 
None 
Levin, Lin & Chu  -4.615  0.000  Rejection of unit root 
  Breitung  0.445  0.672  No rejection, common unit 
root process 
 Hadri  –  –  – 
        
Lags: AIC,  Individual unit root:     
1 to 4  Augmented Dickey-Fuller  36.973  0.000  Rejection of unit root 
  Phillips-Perron  58.163  0.000  Rejection of unit root 
  Im, Pesaran & Shin  –  –  – 
        
Exogen.  Common unit root:      
variables: 
Individual 
Levin, Lin & Chu  1.675  0.953  No rejection, common unit 
root process 
effects  Breitung  -2.552  0.005  Rejection of unit root 
  Hadri  5.698  0.000  Rejection, common unit 
root process 
        
Lags: SIC,  Individual unit root:     
0 to 3  Augmented Dickey-Fuller  4.841  0.963  No rejection, individual 
unit root process 
  Phillips-Perron  2.490  0.998  No rejection, individual 
unit root process 
  Im, Pesaran & Shin  2.812  0.997  No rejection, individual 
unit root process 
        
Exogen.  Common unit root:      
variables: 
Individual 
Levin, Lin & Chu  0.530  0.702  No rejection, common unit 
root process 
effects  Breitung  -2.451  0.007  Rejection, no unit root 
  Hadri  5.698  0.000  Rejection, common unit 
root process 
        
Lags: AIC,  Individual unit root:     
1 to 4  Augmented Dickey-Fuller  5.773  0.927  No rejection, individual 
unit root process 
  Phillips-Perron  2.490  0.998  No rejection, individual 
unit root process 
  Im, Pesaran & Shin  1.512  0.934  No rejection, individual 
unit root process 
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Unit root test  Method  Statistic  Prob.  Result 
Exogen.  Common unit root:      
variables: 
Individual 
Levin, Lin & Chu  0.801  0.788  No rejection, common unit 
root in process 
effects, 
individual 
Breitung -1.896  0.028  Rejection,  no  common 
unit root 
trends  Hadri  7.954  0.000  Rejection, common unit 
root process 
        
Lags: SIC,  Individual unit root:     
0 to 4  Augmented Dickey-Fuller  6.113  0.910  No rejection, individual 
unit root in process 
  Phillips-Perron  3.917  0.984  No rejection, individual 
unit root in process 
  Im, Pesaran & Shin  2.467  0.993  No rejection, individual 
unit root in process 
        
Exogen.  Common unit root:      
variables: 
Individual 
Levin, Lin & Chu  0.330  0.629  No rejection, common unit 
root in process 
effects, 
individual 
Breitung  -1.491  0.067  No rejection, common unit 
root in process 
trends  Hadri  7.954  0.000  Rejection, common unit 
root in process 
        
Lags: AIC,  Individual unit root:     
0 to 4  Augmented Dickey-Fuller  6.863  0.866  No rejection, individual 
unit root process 
  Phillips-Perron  3.917  0.984  No rejection, individual 
unit root process 
  Im, Pesaran & Shin  1.681  0.953  No rejection, individual 
unit root process 
a It must be noticed that the Null hypothesis in Hadri is that there is no unit root in the process, 
while in all other tests the null is that there is a unit root in the process. 
 
 
As these results show, the outcome is very sensitive to the assumption concerning 
the exogenous variables: if we assume that there are no exogenous variables, we 
can in nearly every case reject the existence of a unit root in the process. On the 
other hand when we include either individual effects or trends to the tests we can 
in most of the cases conclude that there is a unit root in the process. As 
mentioned, the unit root in the log dividend yield can be held to be consistent with 
the existence of rational bubbles in asset prices, meaning therefore that during the 
periods in focus (1984Q1–2005Q1) there are bubble/bubbles in the regional house 
prices series in the US. 
  In addition to the unit root tests we counted the ADF-indications for the 
regional data using the 12 quarters rolling window. According to the indications 
given by the ADF-indicator we can observe bubbles in each of these regions 
during the time-periods in focus. One striking character in the indications is that 
we can spot nearly coexistent bubble-indications in each of these regions during 
two periods: 1987–1989 and during 2000–2005Q1. In addition to these there are  
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some special regional bubbles in each case. Next we can take a look to these more 
precise indications by examining figures 9 to 21. 
  Figures 9 and 10 present the developments in the Los Angeles region during 
period 1984Q1–2005Q1. In figure 9 we can see the overall development of the 
housing price index and its change over one year. There are clearly two periods 
characterised by strong growth: period covering years 1987–1989 and a period 
starting from 1995. In figure 10 we have the ADF-coefficent indications for the 
bubble periods. When we held the 0-level as a reference value for critical level, it 
is crossed three times: 1987Q3–1989Q3, 1993Q3–1994Q4 and 2001Q4–2005Q1. 
The first and third of these indications are clearly related to the strong rises in the 
price-level, but the midst-one is rather related to the strong downward correction. 
This could be interpreted to mean that the house prices have corrected too 
strongly compared to the rental flow (it must be noticed though that usually rents 
react with a lag to the price-level movements). 
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In figures 11 and 12 we can see the congruent developments in San Francisco. As 
can be observed from the figure 11, the timing of the strong arises in the prices is 
quite the same as it was in Los Angeles, the difference being the much more 
moderate rate of growth during period 2002–2003. Concerning the bubble-
indications given by the ADF-coefficient values, there are more differences 
between these two cities. As the San Francisco data cover a bit shorter period 
(from 1987Q1 until 2005Q1) the first bubble indications are given right in the 
beginning of the figure related to the 1987–1989 price arise. The second 
indication covers period 1994Q2–1994Q4 and this period is clearly related to the 
downward correction in the price index. The last two indications are received 
during 1999Q2–2000Q3 and 2003Q4–2005Q1. These periods are once again 
related to strong growth rate in the house price index. 
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Concerning the developments in other large metropolis in the US we could take a 
look at the east coast cities New York and Boston. In figures 13 and 14 we present 
the developments in New York and in figures 15 and 16 we present the 
developments in Boston. Compared to the Los Angeles and San Francisco figures, 
the developments in the price indexes resemble them most in New York (figure 
13). In Boston the developments are slightly differently shaped: the continuous 
upward growth starts already in 1991 (figure 15). Concerning the bubble 
indications given by the ADF-coefficient, the Boston periods are shown in figure 
16 and New York periods in figure 14. In Boston the indications are for following 
periods: 1990Q2–1991Q2, 1998Q3–2000Q4 and 2003Q4–2005Q1 and in New 
York for 1986Q4–1987Q3, 1990Q2–1991Q3, 1994Q3–1995Q1 and during a 
rather long period reaching from 1999Q3 until 2005Q1. In New York the first and 
last periods are strongly related to the price index arises and the second bubble 
indication is related to downward revision in the prices. The possible cause for the 
third indication during 1994–1995 is less clear, but the overall indication itself is 
also very short. 
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As a last point we could take a look to two innerland regions and their housing 
price developments. These two regions are the Cleveland-Akron area as well as 
the Chicago-Kenosha area. When looking at the overall price developments in the 
figures 17 and 19, we can immediately notice that the level of the overall arise in 
the index has been much more modest that for example in Los Angeles. 
Concerning the Cleveland-Akron figure (figure 17) it is interesting to see that the 
price change over a year seems to be downward trending over the period in focus. 
In the Chicago-Kenosha figure (figure 19) we can spot two clear arises in the 
yearly price changes: in 1986–1987 and a period starting from 1997. Concerning 
the bubble-indications, for the Cleveland-Akron area the periods are following: 
1989Q4–1990Q3, 1993Q4–1994Q3 and 2004Q3–2005Q1 (figure 18) and for the 
Chicago-Kenosha area 1987Q2–1988Q3 and at time to time during period 
2000Q2–2005Q1 (figure 20). 
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Next these bubble-indications given by the ADF-indicator concerning the regional 
US housing markets can be compared to the bubble-results reported in the earlier 
articles. During the last 25 years there has been at least 2 housing price cycles in 
the US as reported for example by Dreiman (2001). According to her report the 
real house prices peaked in the US in 1979, followed by a 3-year decline which 
ended in 1982. Between 1983 and 1989 the prices rose again, approximately by 
19%, but then the beginning of the 1990s witnessed once again rather strong 
decline in prices between years 1989 and 1995. Starting from 1995 the prices have 
been appreciating and the first articles concerning bubbles in the US house prices 
started to appear in the beginning of 2000s. 
  Case and Shiller (2003) described in their research the developments in the 
several cities during the end of the 1980s as well as during early 2000s, giving 
therefore an excellent reference. According to them the first booms in the Los 
Angeles
29 and San Francisco were quite similar: prices in both metropolitan areas 
peaked in the second quarter of 1990 (in nominal terms 125%). When compared 
to the bubble indications given by the ADF-coefficient, the periods match 
somewhat. The point is that the ADF-indications end before the second quarter of 
1990: in Los Angeles the last bubble-indication is given during 1989Q3 and in 
San Francisco at 1990Q1. Concerning the bust following the strong boom, Case 
and Shiller (2003) reported it to have been the most severe and longest lived in 
Los Angeles as the prices sunk 40% in real terms (29% in nominal), recovering 
only since 1996. In San Francisco the prices dropped less, only by 20% (14% in 
nominal) and they started to recover earlier, already in the beginning of 1993. The 
story in Boston was a bit different: The prices peaked earlier than for example in 
California. According to Case and Shiller (2003) the house prices in Boston 
started to rise rapidly in 1984 and in 1985 they went up by 39%. By the time the 
prices topped in 1988 they had gone up by 140 per cent. Problem concerning this 
period is that our data begins rather late, making us to be able to catch only the 
strong downward correction in the prices in the early 1990s. Concerning the data 
from Chicago the first indications can be reached through Case’s and Shiller’s 
(1987) earlier research where they constructed a quarterly existing home price 
index for period 1970–1986. The real prices in Chicago rose at fastest rate in the 
end of 1977 during period 1970–1986, but the rate was nothing compared to that 
experiences for example in San Francisco by that time. 
  During period 1993–1998 the real cumulative house price appreciation was 
6% as mentioned in the OFHEO 1998Q4 -report. There were large regional 
differences though: the Pacific and Middle Atlantic Divisions experienced total 
house appreciation below the rate of general inflation in their regions. In the 
Pacific Division (Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington) the house 
                                 
29 It must be noted that the regional definitions may not be completely similar in our research 
compared to those used in Case and Shiller (2003).  
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prices were declining in 1993 as well as in 1994 and the appreciation began only 
in early 1995. The Middle Atlantic Division (New York, New Jersey, 
Pennysylvania) on the other hand experienced a real 3% cumulative house price 
depreciation during the period 1994–1996. 
  Since Q2 in 1999 the house prices have been increasing over 5% annually in 
the US and for last four quartals the appreciation have been over 10%, being 12.5 
between 2004Q1–2005Q1. Especially fast the prices have arisen during the last 
five years in California (103% in nominal prices), Rhode Island (97%), DC 
(108%), Hawaiji (83%) and Nevada (83%) (OFHEO, 2005). McCarthy and Peach 
(2004) reported a slightly different list (period 1999–2003), while they reported 
largest house price rises to have taken place in California, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New York, New Jersey and Washington DC. The lowest price rises 
over the last five years have taken place at the state level in Indiana, Texas, Utah, 
Nebraska and Mississippi. Among the 20 bottom metropolitan areas at the five 
year performance period is also Cleveland-Akron area: the price arise over a five 
year period has been only about 20%, being only approx. 3.5% last year. 
  Concerning the more volatile prices in some areas, McCarthy and Peach 
(2004) came into a conclusion that especially the changing demand fundamentals 
should cause the prices to fluctuate more in California and northeast, while in 
these areas the price appreciation is a consequence of improved economic 
conditions combined with relatively unresponsive supply. The point here is well 
appreciated: this could be true for all areas in the short run, while the construction 
of new houses is somewhat restricted in the short-run. This could lead to 
increasing house-prices whenever the demand of houses would increase. At 
easiest this will happen when the low interest rate environment is combined with 
strong belief of consumers on their own economy. To look more thoroughly these 
relationships and their contribution to bubbling real estate prices will be the focus 
of our next research. 
  Concerning the construction, the current housing boom has lasted for 13 
consecutive years in the US: by comparison, the next-longest expansion since 
1970 without significant drops lasted just five years as reported by the Joint 
Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University in their latest Nation’s Housing 
report. At present this has caused the homeownership to post all-time high figures 






Many recent articles have discussed the possibility of bubbles in the housing 
prices at present. An important point is that this discussion is not focused on some 
restricted areas but seems to be a truly global phenomenon. Therefore important 
questions arise, among which the following: if we are in the bubble, is it going to 
burst and what will be the worst consequences from it. 
  It is true that the housing prices have risen quickly in the past years after the 
stock market bubble. Reasons for the quick rise are several: partly this might be 
because of resource allocation from stocks to real estates, but mainly this effect 
has come because of internationally low interest rates which have increased the 
demand in the housing markets. It seems that in many countries home prices have 
risen much more in real terms since 1997 than during any previous boom. The 
Economist (June 18th – 24th, 2005) reported that this current arise in the house 
prices seems to be the biggest bubble in history, being even bigger than the end of 
the 1990s stock market bubble. The threat of being currently in a danger of 
bubbling prices phase was backed also by our various unit-root tests: by unit root 
as well as by ADF-indicator tests which we performed in the country-level as well 
as for the regional level in the US, although due to the caveats these results should 
be interpreted with caution. 
  Even though our new indicator was able to give us quarterly and quite well 
working indications of bubbles, it must be noticed that there are still some serious 
caveats in it. The way it is constructed relies heavily on the present value pricing 
formula and on assumption that we can parallel rent flow with dividend flow in 
order it to function as required we would need ‘freely’ market-determined rent-
flow, which is quite a young phenomenon. In this research we also operate with 
the ‘raw’-data which does not take into account the interest- or tax impacts and 
this could bias the results from the bubble-tests. A further point still is that the 
accuracy of the housing- and rental indices are heavily criticised in many 
instances. Maybe in the future enough data will be available in order to be able to 
try out these estimations with larger frequency and with pure rent-data. And an 
additional problem still is the assumption concerning the distribution of the 
residuals, while they are not normal in most of these cases, meaning that instead 
of the 0-limit for the bubble indications, we should define the critical levels that 
would be in line with the underlying distribution of the residuals. 
  Even though there are several caveats still to be worked out, the purpose of 
this research was to provide a one additional point of view to the bubble-testing 
and judgement of the developments in the housing markets. The method provides 
a new point of view to the subject and is therefore highly experimental, but the 
results seem to give encouraging results in the US for a longer period, but also in 
Europe at least since the mid 1990s when the rent-control in most of the countries  
46 
loosened. Encouraging in a respect, that they indicate pricing-failures, ie bubbles, 
during periods which are documented to be the periods of large price reactions in 
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The purpose of the rent-control was to quarantee an affordable accommodation to 
everyone, to avoid segregation, to redress the landlord-tenant negotiation power 
and to limit rent volatility as mentioned in ECB’s (2003) report, but it created 
some problems as well. The changes in the rent level appeared to be stiff, 
especially difficult being the revisions of existing rent-contracts. Therefore it is 
noticed in the ECB’s report that ‘rents on the new contracts may reflect more 
closely the tightness in the housing market and housing prices, although 
regulations may again set limits on how much rents in new contracts can deviate 
from those in existing contracts.’ Due to the fact that the rent-control system has 
been seen as a source to mis-functioning and shrinking of the rental sector, many 
of the EU countries have revised the systems during the last decade. Basically the 
rent-control can come through three fields, namely either through regulations 
governing how the rents will change during the rental period, regulations 
concerning the new rental contracts or through regulations concerning the contract 
termination. Lately, as mentioned in the ECB’s (2003) report, many of the EU 
countries have moved towards a system where some rent indexation is allowed. 
The major regulatory changes concerning the rents can be seen from the following 
table (table 1): 
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Table A1.1  Major reforms of rent regulations since 1980 
 
Belgium  1984: Rent increases linked to CPI. 
1985–1987: Indexation temporarily suspended. 
1991: Freely negotiated new rental fixed term contracts introduced. 
1997: Limits set to new short-term agreements. 
Denmark  1990: Condominiums built after 1991 exempt from rent control. 
Germany  1983: Introduction of upper limit of 30% in a three-year period on rent 
increases for sitting tenants; rent escalation clauses and rent contracts 
linked to a price index permitted. 
2001: Upper limit on rent increases in a three-year period reduced to 
20%. Period of giving notice for tenants reduced to three months. 
Greece  1997: Freely negotiated rents in new contracts. Minimum duration of 
contracts of three years. 
Spain  1985: Freely negotiated rents in new agreements. 
1995: Minimum lease of five years (at tenant’s option); CPI indexation. 
One-off updating of existing contracts (to be implemented over ten 
years). 
France  1997: New contracts liberalised. 
Ireland  No significant controls/regulations on rent contracts. 
Italy  1992: Freely negotiated new fixed-term contracts introduced. 
1998: Two types of ‘free’ contracts: freely negotiated at the individual 
level at the start and contracts where yearly rent increases are 
collectively negotiated by landlords and tenants. 
Luxembourg  1987: Increases in the rents of dwellings built before 10 September 
1944 and clarification of the meaning of invested capital for those built 
after this date. 
Netherlands  1994: Liberalised more expensive segment of rental markets. 
Austria  1986: Partial liberalisation of new tenancies. 
1994: ‘Indicative value rent system’ introduced. 
Portugal  1981: Freely negotiated rent contracts for new tenancies introduced 
(but no indexation allowed in these contracts). 
1985: Mechanism of updating all rents with CPI; one-off updating of 
old contracts (but still remaining very distant to rents in new contracts). 
1990: Possibility of setting a limit on the duration of rental contracts. 
1993: Possibility of introducing different indexation mechanisms under 
specific circumstances. 
Finland 1990–1995:  Gradual  liberalisation of rent controls. 
After 1995: rents are practically free from public control; they should 
not be ‘excessive’ (in a legal sense). 
Sweden  No major reforms that could improve the efficiency of allocation in the 
rental sector have been undertaken. 
UK  1988: Assured tenancy – eviction easier and initial rent and indexation 
negotiated. 
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Bubble-indications by using a 36 months rolling window 
The regression (3.10) was always estimated by using last 36 months dividend 
yield data. 
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